ideas of the truly
sublime, as the _truth_, if it could be realized, of the above
proposition. Let me not hastily reject without serious reflection,
that, which of all truths, must be the most important. O help me, my
dear friend, help me also, O thou who art the only source of truth,
thoroughly to investigate this momentous subject! But let me not be
deceived. Let me not receive for truth, that which cannot be made
sufficiently clear to my understanding. There can be no more harm in
_doubting_, than in _believing_, where the evidence is not clear. All
that which appertains to eternal truth will remain, whether I now see
it or not; and that which does not appertain to it will never be
realized, although I may now be made to believe it. There can be no
harm, therefore, in investigating this subject in the same way and on
the same principles, as I would investigate all subjects. Although I
cannot expect to offer any thing very new, yet I am disposed to
examine the subject for myself, and that too, in my own way. I shall
quote no authors, for I have not read but few on this subject which
meet my approbation, and even them are not now by me. My own
understanding is the only author to which I shall appeal. If that can
be cleared of the difficulties which have fallen in its way, I am
willing, yea I wish, still to believe in divine revelation.

"Here let me close my preamble, which is already made too lengthy, and
come immediately to discourse 'ON DIVINE REVELATION.'

"In order to know the truth or falsity of any proposition, we must in
the first place understand the terms by which the proposition is made;
for without such previous knowledge, we cannot know what is meant
either to be affirmed or denied. By _divine revelation_, I understand
'a communication of sacred truth,' made directly from God to man. In
order for any man to know that a revelation has been made to him from
God, it must be made in such a way, that neither his perception, nor
his judgment or understanding, can possibly be mistaken. For, as man
by his reason alone, never could have foreseen that a revelation would
be made, therefore, unless it should have been made in such a way that
he could not have been deceived, a rational man would be more likely
to conclude that he was deceived, than that, which to him would seem
more unlikely, should be true. It seems, therefore, that a revelation
from God to all our conceptions of the fact, must be considered, if
existing at all, as something supernatural; otherwise it could be
nothing more than discovery, or a fortuitous event. Hence a revelation
from God, however true, and however clear, to the person or persons to
whom it was first communicated, must lose its evidence, in some
degree, when it comes to be communicated by him or them to others;
for, being communicated to others, although it is still revelation,
yet not being received immediately from God, it cannot be accompanied
with the same evidence which it was in the first place; therefore, to
say the most of it, it is nothing more than the _history_ of a
revelation. It is made no less true than it was before; but its truth
now rests upon very different testimony.

"The principles in nature all existed, before they were discovered by
man. Their being discovered, neither changed their nature, nor made
them any more true. What consternation a total eclipse of the sun, or
of the moon must have produced, before their cause was known? They are
now viewed, especially that of the latter, among the common
occurrences of nature. Yea, many of the operations of nature, which
are now perfectly understood by chemists, could they be viewed by the
common people, who know not their causes, they would be inclined to
believe they were supernatural. At least, it would not be difficult to
make them believe so, especially when this knowledge was confined to a
few, and those few were so disposed. These remarks are not designed to
do away the force of any arguments which may be founded on miracles;
for this is no proof that miracles may not exist; but then, how is a
miracle a revelation of any thing more than what is contained in the
miracle itself? This is what I cannot see, but I shall have occasion
to say more on this subject hereafter. It will be needless for me to
object to the inferences drawn from miracles until a miracle is
proven.

"If a man absolutely knows something of which I am ignorant, and
informs me of it, it makes no difference to me how he come by his
knowledge--it is revelation to me. It may not be divine revelation;
but supposing it is, or is not, in either case, how am I to believe?
Is it any thing that will admit of mathematical demonstration? If so,
I shall take up with nothing short of being convinced in this way. Is
it any thing which he has discovered? If so, he must give me evidence
of such a discovery. Is it something to which he was an eye witness?
Then the truth to me, depends for the present, entirely on his
credibility. I must be convinced in the first place that he was not
deceived himself, and secondly, that he has no motive in deceiving me.
And evidence equally conclusive must accompany the truth of divine
revelation, or it ought not, nay more, it cannot, rationally be
believed. But supposing that I am convinced of the truth, and
therefore believe; and I relate the same to a third person; is it
equally revelation to him as it was to me? Yes, it may be so
considered, in one sense, at least, for it informs him of something of
which he was before ignorant, as much so as it did me, but then the
truth of the fact does not rest with him on equal testimony, and
therefore he is more excusable if he does not believe. If, however, he
can believe all that I believe, and in addition to that, believe also
in _me_, then, and not till then, he will become a believer in the
same truth. But if he even suspects my veracity, it weakens in his
mind, all the other testimony; and though he may still believe in the
main proposition, yet he believes with less strength of evidence.

"Here a very important question arises in my mind. Is divine
revelation something that rests entirely on matters of _fact_; or is
the most essential part, which concerns us to know, a mere matter of
_opinion_? On a few moments of reflection, however, it appears that
this can hardly admit of a question. For all that relates to a future,
and an eternal state, must be a mere matter of opinion only; and the
facts recorded in the scriptures are supposed to corroborate and
substantiate those opinions. Now, as they respect matters of fact, I
believe the scriptures are substantially the same in all versions, and
in all languages into which they have been translated. And if so,
there is no need of learning the original languages in order to become
acquainted with the matters of fact recorded in the bible. We never
should have seen, nor even heard, of so much controversy and biblical
criticism, if the disputes had been wholly relative to matters of
fact. No, all the various readings, different translations, and
interpolations, have little or nothing to do with a dispute of this
kind. But if the facts can he disputed, they must be disputed upon
other grounds than that of biblical criticism.

"Take, for instance, the 'death and resurrection of the man Christ
Jesus,' which you have mentioned; can any one suppose that there ever
was, or ever will be, a translation which makes any thing more or less
in favour of this fact? This is not pretended. And if not, how does a
knowledge of the Greek language help me to believe this fact?

"This brings me again to my main subject; and now two very important
questions arise in my mind.

"1. In relation to the facts, as stated, respecting the life, death,
and resurrection of the 'man Christ Jesus;' are they positively and
absolutely true?

"2. Admitting the truth of the facts, does it necessarily follow, or
is there any thing which renders it certain, that, in regard to other
things, neither he, nor the apostles, so called, could be mistaken?
And that, in all their writings, they have stated nothing which is
incorrect? That is, what certain evidence have we that the writers of
the books, which being compiled, are called the New Testament, were
all honest men? That they could not have been mistaken relative to the
things which they have written? And that in every instance, they have
written the truth?

"Respecting the first proposition, I have already observed that the
truth of it does not, neither can it, depend on biblical criticism.
They are either facts, which are substantially correct, or they are
fabrications. The circumstantial differences between the original
copies themselves, as recorded by the four Evangelists, are much
greater than what can be found in all the different versions,
translations, &c. that have been collated. Hence no argument can be
brought against the truth of those facts from either a real or
supposed difference between the translation, and their respective
originals. For even if not only the original copies, but the language
also in which they were originally written, should be entirely lost,
it would not militate, as I can see, against the truth of the facts
therein recorded.

"The translation acknowledges and affirms itself to be a _translation_
out of the 'original Greek,' together with former translations
compared, &c. Now permit me to ask, is not this as good evidence of
the existence of the _original Greek_, as the original Greek is of the
_facts_ intended to be proved thereby? I should consider the
translation of any work, which was generally known at the time of its
translation, better evidence of the existence of such a work, though
the original should be entirely lost, than the work itself, even in
the original, could be of the existence of facts, which, if they
existed at all, were known at first to but very few.

"You have suggested, sir, that if the original of the scriptures were
entirely lost, future ages would not know but they had been 'imposed
upon.' I think, however, you will not insist on this point, lest you
should destroy an argument, which, hereafter, you may very much need.
I recall my words. For this seems to imply that we are already engaged
in a controversy; whereas, I trust we are both candidly in search of
truth. I suspect, however, there is too much truth in your suggestion;
but then its truth, instead of relieving, only increases my
difficulty.

"Every one must know that when the translation of the scriptures was
first made, the original not only existed, but it must have been known
to others, beside the translators, who were able to detect the
_fraud_, if there had been any, as to substantial matter of fact. And,
in a work of so great importance, this certainly would have been the
case. Hence you will at once perceive, that when the copies were few
in number, and before the art of printing was discovered, fabrications
and interpolations might find their way into the original scriptures
with much greater facility, than could any considerable variations by
an intentionally erroneous translation; especially after the work
become generally known, and so highly valued, as to require a
translation of it.

"As you admit that 'reason is the _eye_ by which we are to examine the
evidences' which stand in support of the 'resurrection of the man
Christ Jesus,' and of course, as I presume, by which we are to examine
the evidences in support of all other subjects, I shall say no more
upon this part of the subject until I hear your reasons for believing
in the resurrection of Jesus; for this fact, as I conceive, must be
considered the main hinge on which the whole Christian system rests,
if it can be supported by any fact, on which it will finally turn.

2. "But after all, my greatest difficulty is with my second
proposition. To relate facts substantially correct, which persons have
either seen or heard, requires no degree of uncommon skill, or
uncommon honesty; but to state things which will absolutely take
place, which are yet future, requires something more than common
skill; and to state things correctly, which will take place in
eternity, must, as I conceive, require nothing short of _divine
wisdom_. That the evangelists have stated nothing more than what is
_substantially_ correct, as it respects matters of fact, will be
admitted by all: for every one knows there is a _circumstantial_
difference in their writings, both as it respects the order of time,
and in several instances, as it respects matters of fact.

"If the account given us of Jesus be even substantially correct, I
think there can be no reasonable doubt but that he was capable of
telling his disciples every thing which it concerns us to know
relative to a future state of existence.--But